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An Appraisal of U.S. Security Assistance to Turkey
Between 1950 and 1992

by

Alpar Karaahmet
Lieutenant Junior Grade, Turkish Navy
B.S., Turkish Naval Academy, 1989

Submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF SCIENCE IN INTERNATIONAL RESOURCE PLANNING
AND MANAGEMENT

from the

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TABLE OF ABBREVIATIONS

AECA	-- Arms Export Control Act
AID	-- Agency for International Development
CPD	-- Congressional Presentation Document
CR	-- Continuing Resolution
DCS	-- Direct Commercial Sales
DSAA	-- Defense Security Assistance Agency
ESF	-- Economic Support Fund
FAA	-- Foreign Assistance Act
FMFP	-- Foreign Military Financing Program
FMS	-- Foreign Military Sales
FMSA	-- Foreign Military Sales Act
IMET	-- International Military Education and Training
JR	-- Joint Resolution
LOA	-- Letter of Offer and Acceptance
MAP	-- Military Assistance Program
MDE	-- Major Defense Equipment
NATO	-- North Atlantic Treaty Organization
PKO	-- Peacekeeping Operations
TLA	-- Transportation and Living Allowance
USG	-- United States Government

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I. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

A. INTRODUCTION

1. General

Arms transfers among all countries in the last decade have reached new levels since the end of World War II. Arms sales have become big business and consequently a crucial dimension of international affairs. Today more countries - both developed and developing - have greater destructive capabilities than ever before. Those sophisticated arms, particularly in developing countries, represent one of the most prominent and disquieting features of our era.

Arms imports are said to be indirect means of ensuring a nation's defense, making it possible for recipient nations to defend their security. They can be instruments of diplomacy, used either to develop closer relations between trading countries or to avoid their deterioration. Arms sales are also said to buy influence and unseen leverage, which is banked for use at critical times when the supplier nation needs the support of foreign nations. [Ref 1:p. 112]

The continuing scientific and technological developments in our era made it possible to produce more destructive, more accurate, and more numerous weapons systems each year. However, for developing countries, it is extremely

difficult to produce a variety of advanced arms, based on high technology. Often these countries do not have sufficient internal economic resources for the establishment of an advanced domestic arms industry. Because they still require technologically advanced weapon systems for self defense purposes, countries will continue to purchase required military weaponry from international sources. [Ref 2:p. 2]

After World War II, the United States became the major arms supplier for its allies and friendly countries. The United States initially provided arms on a "grant aid" basis. Later, when the recipient countries made significant economic progress, "sales" replaced grant aid. Today, the transfer of military weaponry from the United States to other countries is accomplished in three ways: Grants, Loans, or Sales (Military or Commercial).

To implement such world-wide transfers via the Sales Program, the United States has developed the concept of "Security Assistance," covering a broad range of programs which employ funding and legal authority to provide defense articles and training, economic support, and peacekeeping assistance, to key friends and allies. Subcommittees within Congress and organizations within the Departments of Defense and State monitor these programs.

The purpose of this thesis is to describe and evaluate the Security Assistance program used by the U.S. government to supply military assistance to Turkey. It will explain the

trends in U.S. Security Assistance program components' expenditures for Turkey between 1950 and the present. While appraising the implementation of U.S. Security Assistance to Turkey, I will take into consideration three different aspects of arms sales - military, political and economic.

2. Objectives of the Thesis

The research and analysis involved in this thesis will contribute to an understanding of the U.S.-Turkey security assistance relationship during the 1950-1992 period. Turkish officers who work in cooperation with U.S. officials relating to the U.S. Security Assistance program will understand the political dynamics affecting U.S. arms transfers, including the relationship between foreign policy and arms transfer policy.

3. Research Question

The primary research question is this: What factors influenced U.S. arms sales to Turkey during the period of 1950-1992 and how did they affect the U.S.-Turkey defense relationship?

Subsidiary questions include the following:

- 1) What is the current U.S. system for arms sales approval?
- 2) What is the role of Congress in considering legislation opposing arms sales?
- 3) What is the trend in U.S.-Turkey arms transactions historically?

- 4) What factors - political, military and economic - have most influenced U.S.-Turkey arms transactions?
- 5) Does NATO play a significant role in U.S. security assistance to Turkey?
- 6) What other factors affect U.S. arms sales to Turkey?

4. Scope and Limitation of Research

This thesis will focus on the objectives and content of the Security Assistance provided to Turkey by the U.S. during the period 1950-1992. I will investigate the seven components of the Security Assistance program: Foreign Military Sales (FMS) and Foreign Military Construction Sales program, Foreign Military Financing program, Direct Commercial Sales, International Military Education and Training program, Economic Support Fund, Peacekeeping Operations and Nonproliferation & Disarmament Fund. Special attention is given to the strategy associated with the operation of the assistance program. Problems and concerns relating to the changes in U.S. foreign policy and to changes in the global security environment which affect U.S.-Turkey relations are also addressed.

5. Organization of Study

Chapter I will discuss the objectives and methodology of the thesis. Chapter II will explain the U.S. system for arms sales approval. The following three issues will be discussed in this chapter: 1) the objectives and components of the U.S. Security Assistance program; 2) the roles and

responsibilities of the U.S. Government organizations involved in Security Assistance; and 3) the constraints imposed by the U.S. Congress on arms sales.

Chapter III will present the trends in U.S.-Turkey arms transactions. In this chapter, statistical data (the U.S. Security Assistance program components' expenditures for Turkey between 1950 and 1992) will be investigated.

The context of U.S.-Turkey arms transactions will be examined in Chapter IV. Special attention will be given to political, military and economic factors that have most influenced U.S.-Turkey arms transaction. Chapter V will explain three significant events that have affected the U.S.-Turkey defense relationship. These are the Korean War, Greek-Turkey relations and the Gulf War. Conclusions will be presented in Chapter VI.

B. BACKGROUND

1. History

Arms transfers have been part of international relations as long as mankind has been involved in war. The basic desire to obtain arms has not changed with time, only the mechanisms of transfer have changed depending on policy, the technology involved in the transfer, and the military and political relations between trading countries. After World War II, the terms of transfers have changed from "aid" to "trade," arms have become more sophisticated, the focus has

shifted to Third World countries, and more countries have been able to procure advanced and sophisticated arms. [Ref 2:p. 6]

The Truman Doctrine of 1947 marked the beginning of the American policy of "long-term, patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansionist tendencies." It was this doctrine that first established a defense relationship between Turkey and U.S. which eventually led Turkey to join NATO in February 1952. The first implementation of the Truman Doctrine consisted of two agreements, one between the U.S. and Greece signed in June 1947, and another between the U.S. and Turkey in July 1947. According to this second agreement, Turkey received \$122.5 million of economic aid and \$152.5 million in military assistance from the U.S. for two years [Ref. 7:p. 9].

Through its assistance to Turkey, the United States attempted to build up the Army, Navy and Air Force as well as to improve logistics facilities. A series of bilateral Turkish-American military agreements began, starting with the Military Facilities Agreement of June 1954 and continuing under the Defense and Economic Cooperation Agreement of March 1980.

Between 1946 and 1992 Turkey received more than \$11 billion in military assistance, the specific form of assistance changing over time, including grants, credits and cash sales [Ref. 8:p. 174]. In 1993 Turkey received \$450 million in aid from the United States, ranking third in the

list of recipients of U.S. aid, after Israel and Egypt [Ref. 9:p. 9].

Turkey's defense relationship with the U.S. was tested by the Cyprus conflict, first in 1964, and again in 1974. The persistence of intercommunal armed clashes in Cyprus after December 1963, and the failure of both diplomatic attempts and UN force in Cyprus to resolve the situation, led Turkey to contemplate military intervention several times in 1964. In June 1964 the U.S. warned Turkey against military action. This warning (popularly known as "the Johnson letter") forestalled Turkish intervention, but it also shook Turkey out of the comfortable feeling of security it had found in NATO.

The dilemma posed by Cyprus and Greece which had plagued Turkey's U.S. defense relations since 1964, reached a new climax in the summer of 1974. Following Turkey's intervention in Cyprus on 20 July 1974, the U.S. Congress imposed an arms embargo against Turkey on the grounds that Turkish use of U.S.-supplied weapons during the intervention was a violation of the U.S. Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 and the Foreign Military Sales Act. The effects of the Cyprus conflict, the arms embargo, and the Greek-Turkish hostility brought American-Turkish relations almost to a breaking point. The arms embargo significantly affected Turkish defense capabilities until a new defense agreement was signed on 30 March 1980. The arms embargo, which affected major weapons, most adversely by the withholding of spare parts, tended to

highlight the extent of Turkey's dependence on U.S. goodwill for the preservation of its defense capability.

During the Gulf War, Turkey's importance to the U.S. appeared more evident. For the first time, the U.S. conducted combat operations from Turkey, despite the deeply ingrained sensitivities to foreign activities in the homeland felt by the Turks. Beginning in August 1990 and lasting until December 1991, Turkey gave its full support to Operation Proven Force--the air combat operations conducted from Turkey as an adjunct of Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm--and for Operation Provide Comfort -the Coalition effort to provide humanitarian relief to more than 500,000 Kurdish refugees who fled from the Iraqi forces of Saddam Hussein into southeastern Turkey.

2. The Place of the U.S. in World Arms Sales

Before 1935, total annual expenditures of all governments for their war requirements were approximately \$4.5 billion. In today's prices, these expenditures might represent \$40-50 billion. In 1991, approximate total world expenditures were \$1,038 billion. This dramatic increase was due to Third World inventory modernization and expansion, largely financed by profits from export income, particularly oil. [Ref 2:p. 12]

The major political and economic transitions wrought by the end of the Cold War resulted in a significant impact on

the world arms marketplace. The formal dissolution of the USSR contributed to a sharp fall in Russia's arms agreements, while the United States remained the undisputed leader in arms sales to the world. In 1991, the United States accounted for 37.7 percent of world arms exports. While Washington is the most prolific exporter of arms, arms production outside the U.S., especially in Western Europe and developing countries, is increasing both in scope and sophistication. Also, the expansion of arms production in the developing countries since the end of the World War II has been quite extensive. The U.S. role in world arms transfers is depicted in Figures 1 and 2. [Ref 3:pp. 14-15]




Figure 1. World Arms Export Shares, 1991

Source: World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1991-1992,
 U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, March 1994.




Figure 2. U.S. Share of World Arms Exports, 1981-1991

Source: World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1991-1992,
 U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, March 1994.

II. THE U.S. SYSTEM FOR ARMS SALES APPROVAL

A. WHAT IS SECURITY ASSISTANCE?

It is often said that security assistance is an "umbrella" term. It is addressed in a statutory sense throughout the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 as amended (FAA), and the Arms Export Control Act of 1976 as amended (AECA). In Section 502B of the FAA, security assistance is defined:

(d) For the purposes of this section ...

(2) the term "security assistance" means ...

(A) assistance under chapter 2 (military assistance) or chapter 4 (economic support fund) or chapter 5 (military education and training) or chapter 6 (peacekeeping operations) or chapter 8 (anti-terrorism assistance) of this part;

(B) sales of defense articles or services, extensions of credits (including participations in credits), and guarantees of loans under the Arms Export Control Act; or

(C) any license in effect with respect to the export of defense articles or defense services to or for the armed forces, police, intelligence, or other internal security forces of a foreign country under section 38 of the Arms Export Control Act.

Within the President's Congressional Presentation Document (CPD) for Security Assistance Programs, Fiscal Year 1994, five key programs are defined which require USG funding: the Foreign Military Financing Program (FMFP); the Economic Support Fund (ESF); International Military Education and

Training (IMET); Peacekeeping Operations (PKO); and Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund. A former component, the Military Assistance Program (MAP), was integrated into the FMFP in FY 1990. These components, as well as some of the other related activities, are discussed in more detail in this chapter.

In addition to appearing in the CPD to support the Executive Branch's recommendations to Congress on program-funding levels, security assistance shows up in budget documents published by the Office and Management and Budget. In the annual document entitled The Budget Of The United States Government, "international security assistance" is shown as consisting of foreign military financing, military training and other, the economic support fund, and peacekeeping operations. In the same budgetary document, security assistance appears as part of the "International Affairs: Foreign Aid" budget category. [Ref 4:p. 32-33]

Security assistance is also defined in documents published by the Department of Defense. The Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, Joint Pub. 1-02, published by the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Joint Staff), defines security assistance as follows:

Groups of programs authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and the Arms Export Control Act of 1976, as amended, and other related statutes by which the United States provides defense articles, military training, and other defense related services, by grant, loan, credit, or cash sales in furtherance of national policies and objectives.[Ref 10:p. 327]

In general, the United States offers security assistance to strengthen the national security of friendly nations, and to support existing or prospective democratic institutions and market economies. Since World War II, security assistance has become a institutionalized and continuing program used to advance U.S. interests in a global environment. It is not just a short-range program; rather, it is a continuing program, the components and magnitude of which change each year due to U.S. national interests and foreign policy objectives. According to the 1994 CPD for Security Assistance Programs, these objectives are:

- 1) Building democracy
- 2) Promoting and maintaining peace
- 3) Promoting economic growth and sustainable development
- 4) Addressing global problems
- 5) Meeting urgent humanitarian needs

The Security Assistance program is an important tool for the U.S. Government to accomplish these objectives.

B. U.S. SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM COMPONENTS

As was noted earlier, according to the Congressional Presentation Document (CPD) for the Security Assistance Program, there are five key security assistance program components which require United States Government funding. If we add the Foreign Military Sales and Foreign Military

Construction Sales Program, plus Direct Commercial Sales licensed under the Arms Export Control Act (AECA), we arrive at a total of seven programs. A brief examination of each follows.

1. Foreign Military Sales (FMS) and Foreign Military Construction Sales Program

FMS is a non-appropriated program through which eligible foreign governments purchase defense articles, services and training from the U.S. government. The purchasing government pays all costs that may be associated with a sale. In essence, there is a signed government-to-government agreement (normally documented on a Letter of Offer and Acceptance (LOA)) between the U.S. government and a foreign government. Each LOA is commonly referred to as a "case" and is assigned a unique case identifier for accounting purposes.

2. The Foreign Military Financing Program (FMFP or FMF)

This program has undergone a variety of substantive and terminological changes in recent years. At present, the program consists of congressionally appropriated grants and loans which enable eligible foreign governments to purchase U.S. defense articles, services and training. As a grant and low interest loan program, FMFP is distinguished from FMS, the system through which government-to-government sales of military equipment occur. In general, FMFP provides financing for FMS sales. Select countries, however, have been eligible

to use FMFP credits for procurement through direct commercial contracts with U.S. firms outside of FMS channels.

Additionally, in FY 1990, the former Military Assistance Program (MAP), formally merged with the FMFP as Congress adopted a Reagan Administration proposal for integrating all MAP grant funding into the appropriations account for the FMF Program. For FY 1994, the Clinton Administration proposed a total of \$4.087 billion FMF funding, composed of \$3.232 billion in grants and \$855 million in concessional loans. The same proposal includes \$450 million in concessional loans for Turkey [Ref 16:pp. 13-18].

3. Direct Commercial Sales (DCS) Licensed Under The Arms Export Control Act

A direct commercial sale licensed under the AECA is a sale made by U.S. industry directly to a foreign buyer. Unlike the procedures employed for FMS, direct commercial sales transactions are not administered by Department of Defense and do not involve a government-to-government agreement. Rather, the U.S. governmental "control" procedure is accomplished through licensing by the Office of Defense Trade Control in the Department of State.

4. The International Military Education and Training Program (IMET)

This program provides military education and training in the United States and, in some cases, in overseas U.S. military facilities to selected foreign military and related

civilian personnel on a grant basis. Since 1950, IMET and its predecessor programs have trained more than 500,000 foreign officers and enlisted personnel in areas ranging from professional military education to basic technical and nation building skills.

In FY 1989, Congress established a prohibition on the use of IMET funds by any country whose annual per capita gross national product (GNP) exceeds \$2,349.00 unless that country agrees to fund from its own resources the transportation costs and living allowances (TLA) of its students. Thus IMET funds have been restricted to financing tuition costs for these countries. For FY 1994, the Administration allocated \$2.8 million for Turkey out of the total proposed program of \$42.5 million.

5. The Economic Support Fund

This fund was established to promote economic and political stability in areas where the U.S. has special political and security interests and where the U.S. has determined that economic assistance can be useful in helping to secure peace to avert major economic or political crises. ESF is a flexible economic instrument which is made available on a loan or grant basis for a variety of economic purposes, including balance of payment support, infrastructure, and other capital and technical assistance development projects.

The ESF program is administered by the U.S. Agency for International Development (AID) under the overall policy direction of the Secretary of State. The Administration's FY 1994 request for \$2.53 billion reflects a firm U.S. commitment to assist other countries to achieve economic growth and development.

6. Peacekeeping Operations (PKO)

The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, Part II, chapter 6, as amended, authorizes assistance to friendly countries and international organizations for peacekeeping operations (PKO). Historically, funding under this statute has for the most part been limited to support of the U.N. Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) and the Multinational Force and Observers in the Sinai (MFO). With the changing international security environment, the number of situations requiring peacekeeping operations has risen in the early 1990s. Consequently, the amount of this fund can be expected to increase further in the years ahead.

For FY 1994, the Administration proposes a total of \$77.166 million for PKO. This amount will fund both long-standing operations in Cyprus and the Sinai and necessary new initiatives in the former Soviet Union, Haiti and Africa.

7. The Nonproliferation And Disarmament Fund

This program is a new element in the security assistance budget. Following the collapse of the USSR, disarmament of the four nuclear former Soviet Union states

(Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan) has moved to the forefront of the U.S. national security agenda. To help meet these needs, for FY 1994 the Administration proposed \$50 million for a four-part nonproliferation and disarmament program of Education and Training, Destruction and Conversion, Enforcement and Interdiction, and Safeguards and Verification [Ref 16:p. 35].

C. U.S. GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATIONS FOR SECURITY ASSISTANCE

The U.S. Security Assistance program has its roots in U.S. public laws which contain security assistance authorizations, appropriations, restrictions and reporting requirements. To understand how this legislation is welded into a coherent, operational foreign policy program, it is appropriate to briefly discuss the roles of the three branches of the U.S. Federal Government with respect to security assistance.

1. Executive Branch: The President

The Constitution of the U.S. establishes the President as the nation's chief executive and, by inference, the chief arbiter in matters of foreign policy. Furthermore, the same constitution empowers the President, by and with the consent of the Senate to make treaties and appoint ambassadors and other public ministers. The president is also authorized to receive ambassadors and other public ministers - all essential facets of carrying out U.S. foreign policy. Finally, it is the President who presents the recommended annual U.S.

assistance program and budget to the Congress for its consideration and executes this program once it becomes law.

As the chief executive, the President is responsible for all of the activities of the Executive Branch. While carrying out all these activities, the President has numerous assistants, cabinet officers, and other subordinate officials to oversee the conduct of the U.S. security assistance program (See Figure 3).

2. Legislative Branch: The Congress

The Congress of the U.S., as provided by the U.S. Constitution, is vested with all legislative powers. In terms of security assistance, congressional power and influence are exerted in several ways:

- 1) development, consideration, action on legislation to establish or amend basic security assistance authorization acts;
- 2) enactment of appropriations acts;
- 3) passage of Joint Continuing Resolutions to permit the incurrence of obligations to carry on essential security assistance program activities until appropriation action is complete;
- 4) conduct of hearings and investigations into special areas of interest, to include instructions to the General Accounting Office (GAO), the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), and Congressional Research Service (CRS) to accomplish special reviews;
- 5) ratification of treaties which may have security assistance implications.




Figure 3. United States Government Organization
For Security Assistance

Source: The Management of Security Assistance, DISAM, 1993.

With regard to conventional arms transfers or sales, which constitute a major dimension of the U.S. security assistance framework, the ultimate authority for such sales resides in the U.S. Constitution, which assigns Congress the power to regulate commerce with foreign nations. Through the Arms Export Control Act (AECA), Congress has delegated authority to the President to administer the arms transfer program subject to statutorily prescribed standards and conditions.

The work of preparing and writing legislation is performed largely by committees of both houses of Congress. Security assistance legislation must be both authorized and appropriated. The committees which authorize this legislation are the House Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. Appropriations for these programs is done in the House in the Subcommittee on Foreign Operations, Export Financing and Related Programs of the House Appropriations Committee. In the Senate, appropriations for security assistance is done in the Subcommittee on Foreign Operations of the Senate Appropriations Committee. Issues related to security assistance may also be treated by other committees, e.g., the Committees on Armed Services, Banking, and Finance.

3. Judicial Branch: The Courts

According to the Constitution of the U.S., Federal courts are responsible for interpreting federal laws and determining the constitutionality of U.S. law. Normally, the courts have had limited involvement in the day-to-day activities of security assistance. However, in holding all statutory "legislative veto" provisions unconstitutional, the Supreme Court of the U.S. invalidated several clauses of the Arms Export Control Act (AECA) which permitted a "legislative veto" of certain security assistance transfers.[Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha (1983)] These clauses were amended in 1986.

D. CONGRESSIONAL AUTHORIZATIONS AND APPROPRIATIONS

Funding for certain security assistance programs must be authorized and appropriated. Five such programs include: the International Military Education and Training (IMET); the Foreign Military Financing Program (FMFP); the Economic Support Fund (ESF); Peacekeeping Operations (PKO); and the Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund. Foreign military cash sales and commercial exports are also addressed in security assistance legislation - not from a funding standpoint, since U.S. appropriated dollars are not involved, but from a reporting, control and oversight perspective.

1. Authorization Acts

With respect to the current U.S. security assistance program, two basic laws are involved. They are: (1) the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 as amended, and (2) the Arms Export Control Act as amended. Both the FAA and AECA follow a succession of earlier predecessor acts which served as the basis for many of the provisions in the FAA and AECA.

a. The Foreign Assistance Act

Originally enacted on 4 September 1961, this act contains many provisions which were formerly in the Mutual Security Act of 1954. Today, the FAA is the authorizing legislation for IMET, ESF, PKO, overseas assistance program management and a wide variety of other foreign assistance programs.

b. The Arms Export Control Act

This act came into being under a different title, the Foreign Military Sales Act of 1968 (FMSA). Before 1968, the basic authority for foreign military sales was the FAA. The FMSA served to incorporate the Foreign Military Sales Program under a new and separate act. The International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976 changed the title of the FMSA to the AECA. The AECA is the statutory basis for the conduct of FMS and the control of commercial sales of defense articles and services.

The FAA and the AECA may be amended by annual or biennial security assistance authorization acts. Figure 4 identifies the various acts discussed above in the context of their relationship to one another.

2. Appropriations Acts

Security assistance appropriations are included in the annual "Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act" for each year. As its title suggests, this act is the appropriation authority for several programs, including security assistance.

If a new fiscal year begins before an appropriation act has been approved, Continuing Resolution Authority (CRA) is essential to keep the funded foreign assistance programs from coming to a standstill. CRA is defined as:

The authority to obligate funds against the FMFP, IMET, ESF, or other related security assistance appropriation for the new fiscal year under a Continuing Resolution (CR) granted by Congress in a Joint Resolution making temporary appropriations prior to passage of the regular appropriations act, or in lieu of such an act. Normally, however, the CRA is for a designated period less than a fiscal year, and such a CRA does not usually allow funding for the start of any new programs.[Ref 4:p. 45]

For example, on 1 October 1992 there was no completed FY 93 legislation for funding of military assistance and other U.S. assistance programs. Consequently, an omnibus CR was signed on that date extending foreign assistance programs through 5 October 1992. On 6 October 1992 the FY 93 Foreign Operations Appropriations Act was signed into law.

3. Conditions Of Eligibility

While the U.S. government offers a variety of security assistance programs to its allies and friendly nations, Washington usually imposes some restrictions for those countries which can not meet certain conditions. For example, aid may be denied to countries which support terrorism or which are in default on loans to the U.S. These requirements are listed in the FAA and AECA.

E. NOTIFYING CONGRESS

The Arms Export Control Act (AECA) of 1976 requires the President to notify the Congress of certain defense trade export applications prior to their approval. Figure 5 provides a flowchart contrasting the FMS and commercial export sale review provisions.

1. Foreign Military Sales

The AECA requires the President to submit a numbered certification (with justification, impact, etc.) to the Congress before issuing a letter of offer to sell defense articles or services for \$50 million or more, or any design and construction services for \$200 million or more, or major defense equipment for \$14 million or more.¹ The Letter of

¹ Major Defense Equipment (MDE) means any item of significant military equipment on the U.S. Munitions List (USML) having a nonrecurring research and development cost of more than \$50 million or a total production cost of more than \$200 million.




Figure 5. Flowchart of AECA Advance Sales Reporting Provisions

Source: The Management of Security Assistance, DISAM, 1993.

Offer and Acceptance (LOA) shall not be issued if the Congress, within 30 calendar days after receiving such certification, adopts a joint resolution stating it objects to the proposed sale, unless the President states in his certification that an emergency exists which requires such a sale in the national security interest of the U.S. [Ref 5:Sec 36(b)(1)]. In order to provide the Congress with sufficient time to review such cases, the Defense Security Assistance Agency (DSAA) has agreed to provide the Congress with 20 days advance notification of such cases prior to the formal submission of the 30 day statutory notification [Ref 6:Sec 703].

An exception to the above procedure exists for NATO, NATO member countries, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand. For these "exempted" countries, the formal statutory notification period is only 15 days. Furthermore, the 20 days advance notification period is not required for these exempt countries.

2. Direct Commercial Sales

According to the AECA, the President must submit a numbered certification to the Congress thirty days before the issuance of any export license for Major Defense Equipment in excess of \$14 million or other defense articles/services in excess of \$50 million. Unless the President states in his certification that an emergency exists, an export license for

the items shall not be issued within a 30 calendar day congressional review period. Further, such license shall not be issued if the Congress, within such 30-day period, adopts a joint resolution objecting to the export; however, NATO, NATO members, Australia, Japan and New Zealand, are exempt from this joint resolution provision.[Ref 5: Sec. 36(c)]

The President may require that any defense article or service be sold under FMS in lieu of commercial export channels. He may also require that persons engaged in commercial negotiations keep the President fully informed.[Ref 5:Sec. 38(a)(3)]

3. Congressional Joint Resolutions

As indicated above, the AECA contains provisions for the congressional rejection of proposals for specific types of FMS and direct commercial sales. The mechanism for such Congressional action is a "joint resolution." This is a statement of disapproval to a proposed sale, transfer, or lease. The JR must be passed by simple majority votes in both the Senate and the House of Representatives. Such a joint resolution must be sent to the President for review and approval. Since the President is unlikely to approve the rejection of an action which his Administration originally proposed to Congress, the President will likely veto such a joint resolution, returning it to Congress. Unless Congress is able to override the President's veto by obtaining a two-

thirds majority vote in each House in support of the original resolution of rejection, the sale, transfer, or lease will be permitted. However, if Congress can muster sufficient votes to override the President's veto, the proposed sale, transfer, or lease would not be permitted.

III. U.S.-TURKEY ARMS TRANSACTIONS: ELEMENTS AND SCOPE

Since the announcement of the Truman Doctrine, there has been a close military relationship between the United States and the Republic of Turkey. In order to understand the nature of this relationship and its evolution during the past 47 years, we will analyze Turkey's share of U.S. Security Assistance between 1950 and 1992. The data for this analysis are available from the Defense Security Assistance Agency (DSAA).²

In order to explain the trend in the Turkish-American defense relationship in terms of Security Assistance program components, annual expenditures are converted into graphs. The graphs used to present the data are drawn for every Security Assistance program component, and three different positions are depicted to assist in interpreting the U.S.-Turkey assistance relationship. These positions are: 1) The graphs that depict only Turkey's shares; 2) The graphs that compare Turkey and the world; and 3) The graphs that compare Turkey and Europe.

² DSAA, established as a separate agency of the Department of Defense under the direction, authority, and control of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, is the only authorized source of such data. The data used in this research was taken from a report entitled "Fiscal Year Series as of September 30, 1992," published by the FMS Control & Reports Division Comptroller, DSAA. This data is provided in the Appendix.

Not included in this research are two current Security Assistance program components - Peacekeeping Operations and Nonproliferation & Disarmament funds. This is because they are not allocated to Turkey. The Economic Support Fund (ESF) is also excluded because this fund is allocated to countries only for economic development, and select countries are not allowed to spend this fund for military purposes. As a result, the remaining four program components are investigated in this thesis.

A. FOREIGN MILITARY SALES (FMS)

Foreign Military Sales (FMS) graphs represent the total dollar value of defense articles and defense services delivered to Turkey for fiscal years 1950-1992. Defense articles and services can be purchased with cash, credit and Military Assistance Program (MAP) Merger Funds by a foreign government in any fiscal year. In this analysis, Foreign Military Sales Deliveries are used because they represent the actual dollar value of arms sales transactions which occurred under this fund every year.

After implementing a Foreign Military Sales (FMS) agreement, the responsible military department directs release of material from stocks, procurement, provision of services, or training. As execution progresses, the military department reports incurred expenditures and physical deliveries within 30 days of the date of shipment or performance. Figures 6,7

and 8 represent Foreign Military Sales (FMS) deliveries to Turkey.

B. THE FOREIGN MILITARY FINANCING PROGRAM (FMFP)

Although this program currently makes grants and loans, many programs that have been terminated during the period of 1950-1992 can be included in this category. Two different accounts - Foreign Military Financing Direct and Foreign Military Financing Guaranty - were added in order to form the FMFP loan component. The combination of four other accounts - Foreign Military Financing Waived, MAP Merger Funds, MAP Deliveries and Excess MAP/MASF Deliveries - are treated as the FMFP grant component.

Some double counting may have occurred here because some of these accounts may have been used in several places. For example, the amount of credit extended to Turkey (FMFP loans) may be applied to FMS or commercial procurement contracts. MAP Merger funds are included in FMS funds and in order to identify the FMFP grants component, it was added to the other three accounts. Figures 9, 10, 11 represent the FMFP grants and Figures 12, 13, 14 represent the FMFP loans.

C. DIRECT COMMERCIAL SALES (DCS)

Direct Commercial Sales represent the total dollar value of deliveries made against purchases of munitions-controlled items by the Turkish government directly from U.S.

manufacturers. The Commercial Export Deliveries account in the data tables were used to compute DCS. Figures 15, 16 and 17 depict Direct Commercial Sales to Turkey.

D. THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION AND TRAINING PROGRAM (IMET)

The IMET program in the data tables represents the total dollar value allocated in every fiscal year for the training of Turkish military students both overseas and in the continental United States, and the cost of training aids and materials associated with such training. It is considered fully delivered when funded. Figures 18, 19 and 20 represent the IMET program account for Turkey.




Figure 6. FMS Deliveries To Turkey 1950-1992




Figure 7. FMS Deliveries, World Total and Turkey 1950-1992




Figure 8. FMS Deliveries, European Total and Turkey 1950-1992




Figure 9. FMFP Grants To Turkey 1950-1992




Figure 10. FMFP Grants, World Total and Turkey 1950-1992




Figure 11. FMFP Grants, European Total and Turkey 1950-1992




Figure 12. FMFP Loans To Turkey 1950-1992




Figure 13. FMFP Loans, World Total and Turkey 1950-1992




Figure 14. FMFP Loans, European Total and Turkey 1950-1992




Figure 15. Direct Commercial Sales To Turkey 1950-1992




Figure 16. Direct Commercial Sales, World Total and Turkey
1950-1992




Figure 17. Direct Commercial Sales, European Total and Turkey
1950-1992




Figure 13. IMET Expenditures, Turkey 1950-1992




Figure 19. IMET Expenditures, World Total and Turkey 1950-1992




Figure 20. IMET Expenditures, European Total and Turkey
1950-1992

IV. THE CONTEXT OF U.S.-TURKEY ARMS TRANSACTIONS

A. THE FOUNDATIONS OF U.S.-TURKEY DEFENSE RELATIONSHIP

Turkey is a new country in an old land. Although the first historical references to the Turks appear in Chinese records of about 200 B.C., Anatolia (as a geographical expression, it is synonymous with Asia Minor) has been homeland to the Turks since the eleventh century. The modern Turkish state - the Republic of Turkey - was established on 29 October 1923, under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk. The new state is the successor to the Ottoman Empire, which was for centuries a great power in Europe.

In terms of the size of its population and economy, Turkey is not one of the great powers, though it is the strongest among the countries of the Middle East. Its role as a bridge between the Middle East and the West has given it a unique opportunity to combine both cultures.

Since the days of the Ottoman Empire, geopolitical factors have largely determined Turkey's relations with other nations. A strategic position on the Straits has projected the country into the arena of power politics. While maintaining a firm commitment to its Western allies, Turkey has demonstrated its independence by improving relations with Russia and Central Asian Republics and strengthening ties with the Middle East.

It can be said that its defense relationship with the U.S. has evolved from two different aspects, one geopolitical, the other socio-economic.

1. Geopolitical Aspects

The features of Turkey's geography most relevant to the U.S.-Turkey defense relationship are the Straits connecting the Black Sea with the Aegean and the Anatolian high plateau. These are routes from the Russian plains to the Mediterranean and to the Persian Gulf, as well as routes in the opposite direction. Through the Dardenelles and the Bosphorus, which are connected by the Sea of Marmara, Turkey monitors and controls passage between the Black and Mediterranean Seas. As guardian of the Straits, Turkey can deny passage through these waterways and would do so if this were required for its safety in time of war or by its status as a neutral. Rival powers, especially Russia, have in the past been interested in denying Turkey exclusive control over the Straits and may be again in the future.

As Turkey is the only nation between Europe and the sources of much of the Arab oil, it provides a strategic communication and transportation link from sources of this important commodity to its users. Additionally, as a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Turkey provides - along with Greece - the first line of defense for NATO's southern flank. With the end of the Cold War, many

thought Turkey's importance and strategic merit had diminished significantly. As the Gulf War clearly demonstrated, Turkey is the most stable and reliable country in a region which has suffered political instability and turmoil for decades. It can be expected that Turkey will remain so in the future.

It can be argued that these factors shape Turkey's relationship to the U.S. But this is not the entire story. Turkey's socio-economic improvement is another agent in the shaping of this relationship.

2. Socio-economic Aspects

Today's Turkey is Mustafa Kemal Ataturk's creation. The tradition of Ataturk (Kemalism) as a Turkish ideology has provided the broad framework within which the Turkish people strive for a bright future. The twin goals set by Ataturk put a fundamental imprint on the future course of Turkey's relations with other nations.

The goals are to preserve the independence of Turkey within its national boundaries and to continue its modernization. The major implications of these goals are peaceful relations with foreign powers and development along the lines of the contemporary civilization of the West.

Although the great majority of Turks are Muslims, the religious-political-civil code of Islam that regulates all aspects of human life is no longer to be taken as the ultimate authority. Thus, the modern Turkish state is the only secular

state in the Islamic world. While it is trying to establish a strong industrial base and complete its economic development, Turkey has enjoyed democratic freedoms and institutions for most of the past seventy-one years. In short, Turkey's domestic political, economic and social structure is now more diverse as well as more developed.

Turkish dedication to Europe has its roots in the establishment of the modern Turkish state. In the eyes of Ataturk and his followers, there was one civilization, the Western one, and they would join it "in spite of the West." Turkey's Western orientation and its willingness to take part in the contemporary world attracted U.S. attention to Turkey. Although the United States established its formal ties with the Ottoman Empire on 7 May 1830 with the signing of a treaty, relations remained undeveloped during the following years. In fact, this treaty contained a secret article that promised that the U.S. would build and sell warships to the empire. The U.S. Senate rejected this secret article and the treaty was ratified by both sides without the secret article. However, with the considerable assistance by the first American representative to the Ottoman Empire, the sultan obtained the services of a number of U.S. shipbuilders.[Ref 11:p. 13]

Following World War II, Soviet diplomatic pressure in Turkey and communist guerilla actions in Greece became a concern for United States. It was this concern and the U.S.

policy of containment of communism that stimulated a close defense relationship between Turkey and the U.S.

It can be argued that this relationship has evolved from a common fear and threat for decades. However, both countries now enjoy a more mature relationship. It is not limited only to defense. Every year they trade more with each other and U.S. investments in Turkey are rapidly increasing. Turkish desire for a broader or expanded "strategic relationship" with U.S. is today an important Turkish foreign policy goal.

B. ANALYSIS OF THE U.S.-TURKEY DEFENSE RELATIONSHIP, 1950-1992

In order to facilitate the interpretation and analysis of the data on U.S.-Turkey arms transactions, it is useful to divide them into three different groups. First, data showing Turkey's share of U.S. security assistance, in five different aid categories, is displayed (Figures 6, 9, 12, 15 and 18). Second, Turkey's share of U.S. security assistance is compared with assistance to Europe (Figures 8, 11, 14, 17 and 20). Finally, Turkey's share of U.S. security aid is compared to aid provided to the rest of the world (Figures 7, 10, 13, 16 and 19).

This kind of classification is thought to make more sense for arriving at some generalizations and obtaining a plausible pattern for U.S.-Turkey defense relationship. Although this

thesis does not include a detailed mathematical analysis of the data, Figures 6 through 20 reflect certain facts and trends affecting U.S.-Turkey defense cooperation during 1950-1992. Three important dimensions of this relationship - the Korean War, Greek-Turkey relations and the Gulf War - will be investigated in more detail in Chapter V.

1. Group I

The figures which constitute group I reflect the basic fact that the scope of U.S. Security Assistance to Turkey has changed over time. During the 1950s and 1960s grants are dominating in terms of military assistance to Turkey. IMET expenditures (Figure 18) and FMFP grants (Figure 9) constitute the largest share of aid in this period. The main reason for this may be the United States' willingness to share the substantial arsenal which it formed during World War II. It should be kept in mind that Turkey did not have the necessary economic base for such armaments during those years. The combination of these two conditions resulted in the fact that the backbone of the U.S.-Turkey defense relationship has been grants.

In the 1970s and 1980s, the situation changed dramatically. The loans component of the U.S. Security Assistance program to Turkey (Figure 12) gained more importance. It increased significantly while the grants component also went up rapidly. It can be said that grants

continued to be a major component of U.S. Security Assistance to Turkey in this period and that loans didn't replace them.

A second important point is the attitude of the U.S. Congress towards Turkey. From the early 1950s until the mid-1970s, the president and the national security bureaucracy were the key players that shaped the U.S. foreign and defense policy [Ref 12:p. 4]. In the era of the "imperial presidency," the executive branch was the center of the U.S. foreign and defense policy universe [Ref 12:p. 4]. Beginning in the early 1950s, members of Congress increasingly defined their role in foreign policy as one of deferring to the wishes of the president.³

The debacle in Vietnam shattered the norm of congressional deference. In the aftermath of Vietnam, Congress attempted to reassert its role in the foreign policy process.⁴ More important, following the Watergate crisis, the resignation of President Nixon created a power vacuum in the U.S. foreign and defense policy and Congress naturally moved

³ Although congressional deference to the executive branch was never complete, on most foreign policy issues members of Congress eagerly followed the lead of the president. (Carroll 1966; Kolodziej 1975; Manley 1971; Moe and Teel 1971; Robinson 1967; Ripley and Lindsay 1993)

⁴ The general assertion of congressional power versus the Executive Branch was particularly prominent in the early 1970s, when Congress not only exercised greater budgetary oversight, but also passed the War Powers Resolution over President Nixon's veto, compelled an end to U.S. bombing in Indochina, prohibited U.S. aid to anti-Marxist forces in Angola, and conducted hearings to investigate hitherto secret activities of the CIA.

into this vacuum. It can be argued that Vietnam War and the Watergate crisis are the two factors that stimulated the reassertion of congressional power in foreign and defense affairs.

A prominent example is the arms embargo imposed on Turkey in 1975 despite the administration's reluctance. The embargo which was initiated and enacted with strong pressure by the Congress suspended all U.S. military aid to Turkey. From the U.S. point of view, the embargo represents one of a series of legislative initiatives in foreign policy at a time of a weakened Executive Branch. Congress played the determining role in the embargo issue.

In the 1980s Congress wielded increasing influence on U.S. defense and foreign policy. However, both the Reagan administration and its successor Bush administration continuously struggled to maintain a strong Executive Branch despite the congressional involvement. The Republican administrations and its conservative allies in the media, the public policy community, and the Congress were determined to roll back congressional advances into defense policy [Ref 1:p. 18].

The defense budget was increased sharply with the full participation of the conservative Congress elected in 1980. Throughout the 1980s, however, Congress continued to become increasingly more assertive in determining the characteristics of U.S. military forces and weapons, modifying ever more

weapon programs in ever greater detail. Beginning in 1985 the Congress first leveled off and then reversed the continuing defense buildup requested by the administration.

In 1986, against the administration's fervent opposition, Congress passed a sweeping reorganization of the U.S. military establishment that reduced the power of the individual armed services in favor of joint military institutions [Ref 1:p. 19]. In the area of arms transfers, as well, Congress intervened successfully more often in the 1980s than in the 1970s [Ref 1: p. 20].

Finally, congressional oversight of covert operations also became stronger in the 1980s, with specific legislated restrictions modifying several operations that the administration either planned or began in Central America. As revealed during the Iran-Contra hearings in 1987, the administration found a variety of ways to circumvent some of these restrictions. But these circumventions and the consequent reduced scale of the operations are testament to congressional power.[Ref 1:p.20]

In conclusion, it can be argued that although both the Reagan and Bush administrations sought to limit congressional involvement in defense policy making, with only a few specific exceptions the Congress's role expanded even further in the 1980s.

In the light of the above discussion, it can be acknowledged that 1950s, 1960s and 1980s witnessed very strong

U.S. presidents and relatively weak Congresses. However, the 1970s was a decade where weak U.S. presidents were confronted with strong opposition in Congress.

The implications of these two different positions have been enormous for Turkey. Grants and loans to Turkey were greater and more diverse under a strong president, but not so under a strong Congress. The 1970s witnessed a steep decline in U.S. Security Assistance to Turkey, both in scope and magnitude, dropping to zero for some of this period. In short, it can be said that congressional involvement has been devastating for Turkey. Although Turks often connect Congress' attitude with the strong Greek lobby, group II and group III figures depict a different view on this controversy. That is, the Greek lobby's influence on U.S. embargo decision was not significant.

The third important observation is the small amount of Direct Commercial Sales to Turkey in contrast to the high volume of the other programs. According to Figure 15, Turkey only used this account effectively in late 1980s and early 1990s. If 1976, 1977 and 1978 are excluded--because these years represent very small amounts--one explanation for this pattern is the expansion of the Turkish economy in the 1980s.

While the Turkish economy is more market oriented and exports enjoyed a significant increase, Turkey has also sought sources outside the U.S. government to acquire defense goods and services. Although Turkey has not completely integrated

its economy with the world, this burst of economic activity introduced another opportunity for Turkey to obtain U.S. arms. A stronger economy made it possible for Turkey to take advantage of Direct Commercial Sales.

The fourth observation is the steady, twenty-year increase in FMS Deliveries. As Figure 6 represents, despite the fact that Deliveries witnessed considerable decreases in some years (1977, 1981, 1983, 1986, 1988 and 1991), both countries established and maintained good government-to-government relations with regard to defense cooperation and collaboration. Between 1980 and 1983, when Turkey was under a military government, and the following 1983-1990 Motherland party government years under the leadership of Mr. Ozal, Turkey encouraged this process. Although it is not accurate to explain this trend with the sympathy felt by two sides, it is a well-known fact that these two regimes continuously sought strong U.S. support and took great pains to develop good relations with the U.S.

Another observation is more relevant to the political aspect of this relationship. The Republic of Turkey had been governed by military leadership twice since its establishment. The first military government occurred between 1960 and 1962 and the second one between 1980 and 1983. According to Figure 9, FMFP Grants declined substantially during the first military takeover. Although Figure 18 depicts the peak amounts in IMET expenditures for Turkey during this period, it

can be noticed that immediately following this period they witnessed substantial decline.

In the case of the second military takeover, Figures 6,9,12,15 and 18 represent a different view. During this period FMFP Loans (Figure 12), IMET expenditures (Figure 18) and DCSS (Figure 15)--except for 1983, when a relatively small decline occurred--demonstrate steady increases for Turkey. However, both FMFP Grants (Figure 9) and FMS Deliveries (Figure 6) represent first a decline--in 1981--followed by increases.

These two periods of military government in Turkey reflect two different types of U.S. response. The first military intervention into Turkish politics followed a more independent and distant policy towards the U.S. [Ref 13:p. 85-89]. However, the second military government took a more moderate and harmonious approach with regard to its relations to the U.S.[Ref 14:p. 290].

Another important point is the difference in world order during these two different time periods. Iran and Afghanistan fell out of the U.S. alliance system in the late 1970s and the chaos in Turkey was growing each day. From the U.S. point of view, the 1980 military takeover secured Turkey for the West and saved the country from a possible Civil War whose consequences could never be predicted. In short, it can be argued that despite the United State's formal, political opposition to the emergence of military governments in Turkey

in both cases, in practice the U.S. supported the second military government more than the first one because of the security climate at the time.

The last observation deals with the arms embargo imposed on Turkey by the U.S. Congress. This embargo had been effective between 1975 and 1978. The Turkish intervention in Cyprus in 1974 was a factor in the embargo, but this is not the entire story. Relations between Turkey and the U.S. started to deteriorate prior to 1974, when heroin addiction in the United States as a result of Vietnam War became a great concern. As early as 1966, the Washington began to insist that the poppy crop in Turkey should be completely eradicated. Although the poppy was a major cash crop in Turkey and there was considerable reluctance to comply with the U.S. request, under the pressure of the U.S. the Turkish government agreed in 1971 to ban all poppy growing. The decision was very unpopular in Turkey and became a major symbol of Turkish subservience to U.S. interests. In the elections of 1973, every major party opposed the poppy ban and after the elections the new government made it clear to the U.S. that poppy cultivation would resume without regard to the 1971 agreement.

U.S. reaction was immediate. On 13 March 1974, Representative Charles Rangel announced that he would propose cutting off all aid to Turkey if the poppy ban was lifted. On 30 June 1974, the U.S. State Department ordered the U.S.

ambassador to "return for consultation," a traditional means of displaying official displeasure. On 9 July 1974, Representative Lester Wollf introduced a bill to cut off aid to Turkey unless the opium poppy ban was reinstituted; this bill had 238 co-sponsors. On 2 August 1974, after the Cyprus problem had begun, the full House voted to cancel all aid to Turkey. Only considerable pressure by the administration prevented this bill from becoming law. Turkey instituted strict controls over the opium fields, a policy that the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency considered satisfactory. Subsequently, the poppy problem was replaced by the Cyprus problem as the major issue between the U.S. and Turkey.[Ref 11:p. 26]

While the issue of cutting aid to Turkey was already before the House because of the poppy question, Turkish intervention in Cyprus and the use of U.S. armaments in violation of several major arms agreements became an issue for Congress. On 24 September 1974, the House passed an amendment to the Continuing Resolution on Foreign Aid (307-90) that banned military aid and sales to Turkey unless the President certified that Turkey had made substantial progress toward an agreement on Cyprus. This was followed by a presidential veto of the Foreign Aid Act because of the amendment on Turkish Aid, a veto that was sustained on 15 October 1974. After repeated efforts to prevent any aid cutoff from becoming law, on 18 December 1974 the President signed into law P.L. 93-559,

which suspended all U.S. military aid to Turkey. On 5 February 1975 this embargo became effective.[Ref 11:p. 56]

DCSSs to Turkey were resumed by P.L. 94-104 on 6 October 1975. Although MAP funds were included in foreign aid authorizations for fiscal years 1975, 1976 and 1977, the Foreign Assistance Act continued to preclude obligation of these funds. The International Security Assistance Act of 1978, forwarded to the Congress on 21 March 1978, repealed the prohibitions on MAP aid to Turkey.

All the figures confirm the information presented above. Although Figures 9 and 18 depict zero dollar amounts to Turkey during 1976, 1977 and 1978, FMFP Loans (Figure 12) represent a steady increase. FMS Deliveries in Figure 6--except for a steep decline in 1977--and DCSSs in Figure 15 demonstrate that some arms shipments occurred to Turkey during the arms embargo period.

In conclusion, it can be argued that the U.S. imposed a selective embargo on arms transactions with Turkey. While Turkey was prohibited from receiving U.S. grant funds, it did acquire U.S. armaments by loans and cash purchases. Contrary to common opinion in Turkey, the U.S. did not stop all arms shipments to Turkey. It only shifted the scope of its security assistance to Turkey.

2. Group II

The figures which make up the second group have a general point (with the exception of Direct Commercial Sales, Figure 17, of which Turkey's share is almost negligible). For most of the period of 1950-1992, Turkey followed almost the same pattern that Europe followed. It should be noted here the term "Europe" is not synonymous with "NATO". Some countries [e.g., Switzerland, Yugoslavia, Sweden] located in Europe didn't take part in NATO. Although they are not NATO members, they benefitted from The U.S. Security Assistance program. However, their portion is very small and for practical purposes it can be accepted that European figures also represent NATO's portion in the U.S. Security Assistance program. In conclusion, Turkey's share of U.S. arms aid has more or less followed the pattern of U.S. aid to Europe.

The second important point reinforces the first two observations made in group I. The 1950s and 1960s witnessed large amount of grants (Figures 11 and 20). During the 1970s the loans component (Figure 14) made significant increases and with the beginning of the 1980s European countries enjoyed large amounts of grants while at the same time benefitting from loans. It can be argued that the change in the scope of U.S. Security Assistance program was not exclusively for Turkey. In short, the U.S. policy change has affected all countries in Europe and Turkey in the same way.

The last important point is that compared to the high amount of Direct Commercial Sales to Europe, Turkey's share is quite small. This appraisal is also consistent with the third observation made in group I. Although European countries got in touch with U.S. weapons manufacturers in order to obtain arms during early 1970s, Turkey waited until late 1980s to benefit from this alternative. During the 1950s and 1960s Europe recovered from the destruction of World War II and completed its economic development. The 1970s and 1980s were decades during which Europe enjoyed large trade surpluses with other countries. It is plausible that these surpluses allowed them to purchase defense goods and services directly from U.S. firms outside U.S. government channels.

It should be noted here, as Figure 8 clearly depicts, during 1950s and 1960s Europe used FMS Deliveries instead of DCSs. Following the economic development of the 1970s and 1980s, both FMS Deliveries and DCSs increased rapidly and significantly.

3. Group III

The interpretation of group III figures is a little more difficult than the other two groups. This difficulty arises from the large amount of dollars which each account for the entire world contains with respect to Turkey's small portion of them. It is also remarkable that although the entire report lists 201 countries for which these dollars are

spent, Turkey still represents a significant portion of them. Thus, it can be argued that U.S. has given special attention and value to Turkey for the whole period of 1950-1992.

One observation pertaining to the figures for the first and second groups is also valid for the third group. That is the change in the scope of U.S. Security Assistance program components. The 1950s and 1960s have been the decades when the grants component - as Figures 19 and 10 clearly depict - played the major role. Although the loans component (Figure 13) was first introduced in the late 1950s, the 1970s have been the decade when loans enjoyed a significant increase, while grants witnessed noticeable decline. During the 1980s the grants component increased again and reached the peak amount for the entire period. Although loans did not disappear, they showed significant decline and at the end of the period they represent a very small amount compared to the past 42 years. This conclusion supports the two observations made in the first and second groups. It can be argued that this trend has affected all recipients of U.S. military assistance. Except for the period of the U.S. arms embargo to Turkey between 1976 and 1978, aid to Turkey resembled aid to all other countries.

Figures 7 and 10, however, suggest a deviation from this pattern. Until the late 1970s, Turkey's share of FMS Deliveries is almost negligible, in spite of the high amounts of grants (Figure 10). One reason for this is that U.S.

contributions for grants have been mostly in the form of excess defense articles and services instead of hard currency. This policy inevitably resulted in Turkey's inability to purchase contemporary arms through government-to-government contracts. Instead, Turkey acquired excess weapons from surplus stocks of over age and technologically inferior equipment which the U.S. wanted to eliminate from its inventory to make room for new, advanced ones.

Another important point concerns Turkey's share of Direct Commercial Sales compared to the share for the rest of the world. Again, this observation is consistent with the two observations made in first and second groups. That is, Turkey's portion of Direct Commercial Sales made to the world is almost negligible. Turkey did not benefit from DCSs until the late 1980s. Turkey relied heavily on FMS Deliveries and U.S. excess defense weapons during this period.

The last important point deals with the arms embargo imposed on Turkey between 1976 and 1978. Both IMET expenditures (Figure 19) and FMFP Grants (Figure 10) represent a zero level during this period for Turkey. The important point is that these two accounts bottomed out for all other countries during this same period. In short, it can be argued that although Turkey did not benefit from these two accounts between 1976 and 1978, neither did many other countries, since the U.S. cut IMET and FMFP aid to all recipients during this period.

V. SIGNIFICANT HISTORICAL EVENTS

While appraising the U.S.-Turkey defense relationship between 1950 and 1992, considerable attention must be given to three important historical events. These three events can be accepted as determining the fundamental nature of this relationship. Their effects, both positive and negative, are still apparent. These three events are the Korean War, Greek-Turkish relations and the Gulf War.

A. THE KOREAN WAR

By mid-1948, the U.S. had become interested in establishing a formal collective security arrangement for Europe. In March 1948, when England, France, Belgium, Holland, and Luxembourg signed the Brussels Pact for collective defense, the U.S. announced its support of this arrangement, and by June of that year the U.S. was actively engaged in laying the basis for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. NATO, an alliance originally envisaged as restricted exclusively to Western European states, officially came into being in April 1949 with no provision for Turkish membership.[Ref 13:p. 35]

Because it was not geographically located in the immediate Atlantic area, Turkey was not invited to become a charter member of the organization. This fact was not viewed with

pleasure by the Turks, for it was felt that being excluded from NATO could cause a reduction in the amount of aid coming from the U.S. Some Turkish leaders also expressed concern that by barring further Soviet encroachment in Western Europe, NATO might induce the USSR to increase pressure on less firmly protected points such as Turkey.[Ref 13:p. 36]

Throughout 1948 and 1949, the Turkish government continually tried to join NATO. Although the U.S. repeatedly expressed sympathy for Turkish participation, opposition from the European members of the alliance, especially the British and Scandinavians, prevented Turkish admission [Ref 13:p. 37]. The Korean War provided Turkey a new opportunity to join the organization.

The Korean War broke out one week after the first multiparty elections are held in Turkey. A new government took office with a landslide victory on 14 May 1950. On 27 June 1950 the UN Security Council invited the organization's members to repel an armed attack by North Korea, aided and abetted by the USSR, against the Republic of Korea. In response to this request, the Turkish government offered to send a mixed brigade of 4,500 men to the conflict. This unit was the third largest to participate in this action, after the American and South Korean forces. As a result of their distinguished actions, the Turks were highly praised by the other forces.[Ref 17:p. 10]

To make use of the advantage provided by the actions of their troops, the Turkish government made a formal request to join NATO on 1 August 1950. The NATO members, not wishing at that time to openly antagonize the Soviets by accepting members at their very border, decided upon a compromise. Turkey, along with Greece, who had previously requested membership, were not offered full membership status, but were invited to join in the planning of the NATO military strategy for the Mediterranean area. Both nations accepted this proposal, and in October 1950 became "partial" members of NATO. The following September both the U.S. and Britain proposed that they be allowed to become full members. This proposal was accepted by the organization and on February 18, 1952, Turkey and Greece became full members of NATO.[Ref 17:p. 11]

From the Turkish point of view, the Korean War was critical to Turkish participation in NATO. First, U.S. military and economic aid was automatically guaranteed, because Turks regarded NATO as an extension of the U.S. Acceptance by the Atlantic alliance was also an act confirming Turkish belief that Turks were, and should be recognized as, an integral part of Europe. Furthermore, the image of the U.S. as the protector of small nations had been confirmed again with the Korean War. Subsequently, Turkish opinion makers felt the greatest confidence in the U.S.[Ref 13:p. 44]

From the U.S. point of view, the communist invasion of South Korea clearly showed to the West that its security might be immediately jeopardized. The aggression proved that the Soviet Union possessed the capability of "taking, or inspiring through satellites, military action ranging from local aggression on one or more points along the periphery of the Soviet world to all-out general war" [Ref 18:p.101]. As President Truman expressed it in his message to Congress on 19 July 1950, "...the U.S. is required to increase its military strength and preparedness not only to deal with the aggression in Korea but also to increase our common defense with other free nations, against aggression." Furthermore, although the USSR may not have desired a general war, it hoped to exploit the crisis to break up NATO [Ref 18:p. 102]. The major contest, then, between the U.S. and U.S.S.R. was not just over Korea but concerned the steadfastness of U.S. commitments abroad.

Under these assessments, it is quite plausible that the Korean War stimulated the immediate need to support other friendly nations against potential communist aggression. This need applied to Turkey, which had for years suffered demands from the USSR for the cession of three provinces and the right to station troops on the Bosphorus.

These conclusions are also consistent with the Figures 8, 9, 10, 11, 18, 19 and 20. FMS Deliveries (Figure 8) came into being with the Korean War and showed significant increases in

the following years. FMFP Grants (Figures 9, 10, 11) witnessed substantial increases with the outbreak of the war and as Figure 11 demonstrates, Europe (NATO) was the major beneficiary of this account between 1950 and 1955. IMET Expenditures also enjoyed steep increases and again, as Figure 20 depicts, Europe received the lion's share between 1950 and 1955.

The Korean War led the U.S. to strengthen its commitment to Turkey's defense. Bilateral relations gained a new dimension with Turkish participation in NATO. Consequently, the U.S.-Turkey defense relationship was significantly enhanced and Turkish integration with the West encouraged.

B. GREECE-TURKEY RELATIONS

The relationship between Greece and Turkey has been characterized by severe tensions since the revolution that brought Greece independence from the Ottoman Empire in 1821. Historical antagonisms and suspicions have persisted in spite of their status as NATO allies. Relations between the two countries remained potentially explosive in the 1970s and 1980s, with conflict centering on the problem of Cyprus and control of the Aegean Sea and airspace. Disputes between Turkey and Greece have served to complicate both countries' relationships, not only with each other, but also with the U.S.

1. The Cyprus Problem

Cyprus is an island of 3,572 square miles, located in the Mediterranean about 40 miles from Turkey and 60 miles from Syria. It is strategically located, in that military forces operating from Cyprus could dominate southern Turkey and much of the eastern Mediterranean.

From 1571 until 1878, the island was a part of the Ottoman Empire, that is, under Turkish sovereignty. Because of its strategic location, beginning in 19th century, Britain showed great interest to Cyprus in quest of security for its trade routes to India. In 1878, Britain leased Cyprus from the Ottoman Empire for 30 years, primarily for use as a naval base.

When the Ottoman Empire was drawn into World War I, Britain formally annexed Cyprus as a colony. This ended the period of Turkish sovereignty over the island. The new Turkish republic, founded in the aftermath of World War I, agreed to this arrangement and until the 1950s the situation on the island remained relatively static.

In 1958, the British changed their view of the strategic importance of Cyprus and decided they needed to retain only small sovereign base areas for their defense purposes[Ref 11:p. 32]. The question of Cyprus's future arose immediately. In order to resolve the problem, Turkey, Greece and Great Britain signed a set of accords with Cyprus in 1959. While granting independence to Cyprus, they prohibited Cyprus

from partition or union with another independent country. These accords, called the Treaty of Guarantee, also prescribed certain percentages for majority and minority participation in the Cypriot Army and Civil Service and reserved the right for each signing nation to unilaterally defend the treaty's provisions.[Ref 17:p. 20]

Cyprus became an independent state in 1960. Since then, the desire of the island's pro-Greek majority to unite with Greece and not remain a separate entity caused major unrest between Turkish and Greek Cypriots. In late 1963, this unrest reached the point where the island was split by civil war. In order to resolve the conflict, a conference took place in London in January 1964 which led to a U.N. resolution to place a peace-keeping force on Cyprus[Ref 17:p. 21].

This force, the United Nation's Peace-Keeping Force in Cyprus, arrived on Cyprus on March 14, 1964. Even the use of these U.N. forces couldn't stop heavy fighting between the two communities. As a result of serious defeats for the Turks, the Turkish government decided to uphold the Accord's provisions and prepared to land troops on Cyprus. The operation was stopped after President Johnson sent a personal letter to the Turkish Prime Minister, Ismet Inonu.

The "Johnson Letter" was one of the major turning points in U.S.-Turkish relations. It warned that if Turkish action in Cyprus brought on a Soviet invasion of Turkey, the U.S. and NATO would not be obligated to protect Turkey. It

also warned that U.S. military equipment could not be used in a Cyprus intervention[Ref 11:p. 33]. The letter led to the abandonment of the plan for Turkish military intervention in Cyprus, as requested by President Johnson. Nevertheless, Turkish military aircraft flew a number of missions in support of Turkish Cypriot positions.

While the Johnson Letter did not cause a major break with the U.S., it did significantly affect Turkish public opinion and caused a reorientation of Turkish foreign policy away from total dependence upon the U.S.[Ref 13:p. 114-115]. The relationship which had been born with the Truman Doctrine, and had grown from that time, was never again to be based on as much trust and so strong a foundation as before the Cyprus crisis of 1964.

In November 1967, intercommunal fighting broke out on Cyprus again, and again the Turkish government prepared to use military intervention to protect its interests on the island. It issued an ultimatum to the government of Greece, stating that Turkish troops would intervene if peace was not restored and Greek troops illegally present on Cyprus withdrawn [Ref 11:p. 33]. Again, U.S. and UN efforts restored the peace, leaving two independent armed groups on Cyprus, with UN troops providing buffer zones.

In 1974, the situation worsened. A number of Greek military officers, sent to Cyprus as advisors to the Cyprus National Guard, participated in a coup against President

Makarios on 15 July 1974. These officers were under the orders of the Athens government, rather than being responsive to Makarios. Acting on the orders of the Athens government, they replaced Makarios with Nicos Sampson, who had been anti-British and anti-Turk [Ref 11:p. 34]. In view of his previous anti-Turkish activity, he was an unacceptable choice for both Turks and Turk Cypriots.

The U.S. did not initially make any statements or take any action to place responsibility for the coup with the Greek junta, or to request withdrawal of the Greek officers who had led the coup. This seemed to imply a tacit approval of Sampson as the leader of Cyprus. Nor did the Turks see any action being taken by the U.S. or the UN to restore the neutral government of Makarios. In fact, all signs indicated that "enosis" (union with Greece) was about to become a reality.

Following the coup, the Turkish government asked for British intervention under the terms of the 1959 treaty. When this was refused, Turkey sent troops to Cyprus on 20 July 1974. The intervention resulted in the fall of the Greek military junta and the replacement of Sampson by a much more moderate and respected Greek Cypriot. The question of cutting off aid because of the use of U.S. arms by the Turks arose immediately and finally ended with an arms embargo. The intervention also caused massive population shifts on the island, which brought about its effective partition into a

Turkish Cypriot north and a Greek Cypriot south. [Ref 17:p. 32-33]

The Cyprus problem remained unresolved and continues to cause tension between Turkey and Greece. The November 1983 declaration of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, recognized by Turks but deemed legally invalid by the U.N. Security Council, further exacerbated the situation. Greece continues to demand the withdrawal of the Turkish troops from Cyprus, which Turkey maintains are essential for the protection of the island's 18 percent Turkish minority against Greek Cypriot domination.

2. Points Of Contention in the Aegean Region

Conflicts between Greece and Turkey over territorial rights and interests in the Aegean Sea continued to resist solution in the 1970s and 1980s and brought the two countries close to war on more than one occasion. A fundamental source of contention was the right to explore for minerals, primarily oil, beneath the Aegean Sea. The lack of agreement about what constitutes the Aegean continental shelf caused two different definitions by both sides. Turkey defined the Aegean shelf as a natural prolongation of the Anatolian coast, whereas Greece claimed that the Greek islands had their own shelves.

The issue was further complicated by Greece's claim to territorial waters surrounding all of its 2,383 Aegean islands. Turkey has maintained that if Greece carried out its

threat to extend its six-nautical-mile territorial claim around each island to 12 nautical miles, the action would be considered a cause for war. War nearly occurred in 1976 and 1987, when both countries sent seismic-research ships to prospect in disputed waters and subsequently proclaimed a state of military alert. The threat of war has receded as a result of announcements by both governments that they would not move into the disputed waters.[Ref 14:p. 301]

The issue of the right to control the airspace over the Aegean is another source of conflict between Turkey and Greece[Ref 11:p. 27]. For a number of years, this meant that planes could not fly directly between Turkey and Greece. Disagreements over the median line, dividing the Aegean into approximately equal sectors of responsibility, remain unresolved[Ref 14:p. 302].

The offshore islands, which belong to Greece, have been another issue between the two countries for many years. Because of their strategic position (some of these islands can be seen from Turkish territory very clearly), Turks have been very sensitive concerning their militarization by Greece. Although both the 1923 Treaty of Lousanne and the 1947 Treaty of Paris require a demilitarized Aegean, Turkey has maintained that Greece has fortified the islands in violation of these treaties. Turkey responded to the Greek buildup on these islands by creating an Aegean army in western Anatolia, accelerating a mutual military buildup in that region.

As a result of these developments, Greece has repeatedly requested from the U.S. and NATO a security guarantee of its eastern borders against Turkey. Turkey, however, regards this request as inconsistent with the principles of the NATO alliance, stating repeatedly that it has no claims on Greek territory, either in the Aegean islands or in Thrace, the northeastern part of Greece which borders Turkey.[Ref 15:p. 316]

Because of the significant and persistent political tension between Turkey and Greece, maintenance of a stable military balance in the Aegean region has been an important factor in the provision of U.S. security assistance for the region. Section 620C(b) of the 1961 Foreign Assistance Act stipulates that U.S. security assistance to Turkey and Greece "shall be designed to ensure that the present balance of military strength among countries of this region ... is to be preserved." In general, the U.S. has dealt with this requirement by maintaining a seven-to-ten ratio in its assistance to Greece and Turkey, i.e., Greece is guaranteed \$7 of military aid for every \$10 that Turkey gets. Furthermore, in recent years the U.S. Congress also tried to impose conditions linking aid to Turkey to progress on a Cyprus settlement.

The Turkish government regarded the seven-to-ten ratio as inequitable given that Turkey had a population five times that of Greece, with corresponding heavier NATO commitments and a

less resilient economy. It also rejected the perception implied in this ratio that Turkey constitutes a military threat to Greece. Nevertheless, the Fiscal Year 1994 funding levels for Greece and Turkey sustain the seven-to-ten ratio of security assistance that Congress has maintained for the two countries since Fiscal Year 1980[Ref 16:p. 17].

C. THE GULF WAR

As discussed earlier, Turkey has for many years focused on Europe, attempting to integrate itself into the European community. As part of that policy, it has virtually turned its back on the Middle East, even though for centuries Turkey was predominantly a Middle East power.⁵

Today the principal threat to Turkey's security originates in the Middle East [Ref 19:p. 31]. Radical groups, such as the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK), the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA) and Hizbollah, which are carrying out subversive operations against the Turkish state, are based there. These groups have mounted a formidable threat to Turkey's internal security in the current period.

In this context, the Gulf War represents the most recent major turning point for Turkey's foreign and defense policy. In order to understand how the Gulf War affected Turkey, two

⁵For a review of Turkey's experience as a major Middle Eastern power, see George Lenczowski, The Middle East in World Affairs, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1980.

important different events have to be taken into consideration.

1. Operation Desert Storm

At the direction of the late President Turgut Ozal, Turkey played a major role in Operation Desert Storm. Beginning in August 1990, with the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, and lasting until December 1991, Turkey provided full support for Operation Proven Force, the air combat operations conducted by U.S. forces from Turkish bases as an adjunct of Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm[Ref 20:p. 55]. For the first time, the U.S. conducted combat operations from Turkey, despite the historic and deeply ingrained opposition to foreign activities in their homeland felt by the Turks.

Although Turkey did not go to war with Iraq, the precautions taken by Turkey--such as the interdiction of Iraq's oil pipelines through Turkey and stationing of U.S. fighter aircraft at Turkey's Incirlik air base--put enormous pressure on Iraq.

Another important observation with regard to the Turkish position in Operation Desert Storm deals with changes to the principles of Turkish foreign policy laid down by its founder Kemal Ataturk. According to Ataturk, the Turks have to take pains to maintain good relations with their immediate neighbors--Iraq, Iran and Syria. This policy was meant to offset distrust among the neighbors caused by the policies of

the Ottoman Empire. During the six decades since its establishment, Turkey maintained this principle. However, with the development of the Kuwait crisis and under the leadership of the late President Mr. Ozal, Turkey changed course and actively supported the coalition efforts against Iraq.[Ref 19:p. 38]

2. Operation Provide Comfort

Following the war, Turkey was forced to address another issue in the eastern region. As a result of the post-conflict Kurdish rebellion in Iraq, Turks witnessed the abrupt and unexpected stampede of thousand of Kurds into their homeland. Operation Provide Comfort--the coalition effort to provide humanitarian relief to more than 500,000 Kurdish refugees who fled from the Iraqi forces of Saddam Hussein into southeastern Turkey--tested Turkey's pro-coalition policy in two main areas.

First, it strained Turkey's economy in ways that it could not absorb. Ankara had to care for the Kurdish refugees. Second, the problem had also a security dimension. While the Turkish army is striving to restore order in that region against the radical groups (i.e., PKK), with the chaos resulting from Operation Desert Storm and Operation Provide Comfort, it was attacked by the most violent wing of the Kurdish movement [Ref 19:p. 41]. Thus, while world public opinion embraced the Kurds, the Turkish security forces have

been harshly criticized for its response to the Kurdish separatists.

In the light of the above discussion, it is quite plausible to assert that the U.S. and Turkey had very close defense cooperation during 1991 and 1992. Turkey stood by the U.S. throughout both Operation Desert Storm and Operation Provide Comfort. A close look at Figures 6 through 20 reveals the situation in terms of arms transactions between the U.S. and Turkey during this period.

FMS Deliveries, which are represented in Figures 6, 7 and 8, indicate that Turkey reached the highest level in this account during 1991 and 1992. According to Figures 9, 10 and 11, which demonstrate FMFP Grants, Turkey again received its highest portion of this account in this period.

FMFP Loans and the DCS account represent a different view. FMFP Loans (Figure 12) and DCS (Figure 15) for Turkey dropped to very low levels for 1991 and 1992 compared to past years. However, FMFP Loans for Europe and World (Figures 14 and 13) and DCS for Europe and World (Figures 17 and 16) also show very low levels during this period. It can be argued that the drop in these accounts was not unique to Turkey. Neither Turkey nor the other recipient countries benefitted much from these two accounts in 1991 and 1992.

As Figures 18, 19 and 20 demonstrate, Turkey essentially maintained its portion in the IMET Expenditures account in 1991 and 1992. Although IMET funds didn't reach their highest

portion in this period, the aid received by Turkey during the Gulf War was significant.

In conclusion, the Gulf War confirmed Turkey's importance to the West and especially the U.S. In spite of its historical, religious, and cultural ties to the Middle East, Turkey again showed its support for the military policies of the Western democracies and reinforced its position as a "reliable" ally to the U.S. and NATO. U.S. security assistance to Turkey during the Gulf War, mostly in the form of grants rather than loans and direct purchases, reached peak levels.

VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

A. CONCLUSIONS

The purpose of this research has been to bring together in one document as much of the unclassified information as possible concerning security assistance from the United States to Turkey between 1950 and 1992. It has identified the factors that have affected the U.S.-Turkey security assistance relationship during this period and provided specific data on the amount of U.S. security assistance to Turkey. Interpretation of this data led to the conclusions addressed below.

Turkey occupies a unique and strategic position in U.S. defense policy. The United States does not view Turkey as an ordinary foreign country. As both the total composite and annual amounts of U.S. security assistance provided to Turkey show, Turkey received a considerable amount of military assistance from the United States between 1950 and 1992.

Over the period during which the United States and Turkey developed a security relationship, several factors stand out as most influential. Specifically, the Korean War, NATO and the Gulf War enhanced this relationship. Greek-Turkish relations, on the other hand, tended to weaken it. The levels of transactions, depicted in Figures 6 through 20, confirmed

that these factors had a significant influence in shaping U.S. security assistance to Turkey.

Of the five different components of the U.S. security assistance program, four of them -- FMFP Grants, FMFP Loans, FMS Deliveries and IMET Expenditures -- are viewed as the most significant ones. The DCS account is of little significance compared to other four accounts. Thus, Turkey benefitted mostly from arms transactions financed by USG funds instead of its own financial resources.

During the period 1950-1992, the levels of FMFP Grants, FMFP Loans and IMET Expenditures varied the most. FMS Deliveries and DCS accounts did not show as much variance as the other three do. This is because these three accounts -- FMFP Grants, FMFP Loans and IMET Expenditures -- are financed by the U.S. government. As such, they have been subject to the positive and negative factors influencing U.S. policy towards Turkey.

It should be noted here that some of this variance can not be explained by those factors. This suggests that there are some other factors that affect the U.S.-Turkey security assistance relationship.

For most of the period from 1950 through 1992, Turkey's share of U.S. arms aid has followed the pattern of U.S. aid to Europe-NATO. This pattern did not minimize the significance of the Korean War, Greek-Turkish relations and the Gulf War for the U.S.-Turkey relationship. NATO was the backbone of

this relationship and determined the level of U.S. security assistance provided to Turkey. Nevertheless, the other three factors either intensified or lessened this pattern for certain periods of time.

This trend is very important, because with the collapse of the Soviet Union and communism in the late 1980s, the apparent purpose of NATO's existence had disappeared. Thus, NATO's future remains uncertain. The important question, then, is this: Will NATO continue to determine the U.S. security assistance provided to Turkey in the future as it did until now? Or, with the diminishing importance of NATO, will bilateral relations and U.S. policy toward the Middle East gain more importance in determining U.S. security assistance to Turkey?

In this context, the Gulf War represents a good example. During the war, United States-Turkey defense relations gained a new dimension with the enhanced cooperation of the two countries' armed forces. More bilateral relations may follow, depending upon the security environment in Europe and the Middle East.

The U.S.-Turkey security assistance relationship does not follow a pattern similar to U.S. arms relationships with the world. The five components of the U.S. security assistance program provided to the world show significant variances compared to Turkey's portion in these accounts. This fact leads to the conclusion that the factors which affected U.S.-

Turkey security assistance relationship did not affect all countries in the world as they did Turkey.

The arms embargo imposed by the U.S. on Turkey during the period 1975-1978 was selective. While Turkey was prohibited from receiving U.S. grant funds, it did acquire U.S. armaments by loans and cash purchases. The U.S. did not stop all arms shipments to Turkey. It only shifted the scope of its security assistance to Turkey.

The U.S. Congress has played an important role in shaping the U.S.-Turkey security relationship. The political dimension of this relationship has an enormous impact on the amount of U.S. military aid to Turkey. Congress exerted its power in different time periods in different ways.

Especially during the 1970s, when presidential authority was weakened, Congress was directly involved in determining the level of U.S. security assistance to Turkey and successfully curbed it between 1975 and 1978 despite the administration's opposition.

Although Congress continuously supported the President's proposed security assistance levels to Turkey during the 1950s, 1960s and 1980s, when presidential authority was in its highest levels, beginning in 1980 it also succeeded in linking the annual amount of U.S. security assistance to Greece to the amount provided to Turkey. This is a clear indication of how Congress views the regional security effects of U.S. security assistance to this region of the world.

Moreover, as an ultimate authority which authorizes and appropriates United States Government funds to provide arms and services to foreign countries, Congress also changed the scope of the U.S. security assistance to Turkey on several occasions.

Congressional involvement in determining U.S. security assistance to Turkey has negatively affected Turkish ability to acquire contemporary U.S. armaments and services. This is because of the limited resources of the Turkish economy for its arms transactions with the U.S.

In conclusion, the security assistance relationship between the U.S. and Turkey has been strong, in spite of certain difficulties which have occurred during the last 42 years. Given the new security environment in Europe and Middle East, it is not expected that the security assistance relations between the two nations will undergo rapid, major changes. Although Turkey has diversified its arms suppliers by turning more to European nations and development of a domestic industry in recent years, the U.S. will probably remain the major weapons supplier for the near future.

B. RECOMMENDATIONS

In this research several areas were encountered which were beyond the scope of this study. However, they deserve further investigation.

The seven-to-ten ratio which was maintained by the U.S. in its military assistance to Greece and Turkey is one of these areas. Although there is no special provision in U.S. law with regard to this ratio, since 1980 the annual amount of U.S. security assistance to Turkey and Greece confirms this tacit requirement. Both the implementation and the development of this ratio should be included in this research.

A second area of interest concerns the military cooperation between the U.S. and Turkey during the Gulf War. Although Turkey did not go to war against Iraq on the U.S. side, the prospects for a second front against Iraq may have instigated a controversy between the two countries. However, because of the lack of unclassified, official information on this issue, it is not included in this research. It is hoped that a detailed examination will shed light on these events and further contribute to an understanding of the U.S.-Turkey defense relationship during the Gulf War.

Another area for further research is the kind of arms provided to Turkey by the United States security assistance program during the 1950-1992 period. This research has primarily focused on the dollar amount of arms transactions that have occurred in the past 42 years. The types of weapons (e.g., offensive or defensive, high or low technology, the diversification of these weapons as ground, air or naval) have not been taken into consideration while appraising these transactions. Such a different approach may lead to different

interpretations of U.S.-Turkey security assistance relationship.

In this research, Turkey's portion of U.S. security assistance was compared with Europe-NATO's portion of U.S. security assistance and total U.S. security assistance provided to the world. Comparison of Turkey's portion of U.S. security assistance with another or a number of different countries' portions of U.S. security assistance is another area for further research. This kind of study may identify new factors that affected the U.S.-Turkey security assistance relationship and result in new and different interpretations of this relationship.

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FISCAL YEAR SERIES

APPENDIX



AS OF SEPTEMBER 30, 1992

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COMPTROLLER, DSAA**

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GLOSSARY OF ACRONYMS USED IN COLUMN HEADINGS	
FMS	- Foreign Military Sales
FMCS	- Foreign Military Construction Sales
MAP	- Military Assistance Program
MAAF	- Military Assistance, Service Funded (Military Departments)
IHET	- International Military Education & Training Program

WORLDWIDE

D S A A F I S C A L Y E A R S E R I E S
(DOLLARS IN THOUSANDS)

YEAR	TOTAL SALES AGREEMENTS	TOTAL SALES DELIVERIES	FMS AGREEMENTS	FMS- DELIVERIES	FMCS AGREEMENTS	FMCS DELIVERIES	FOREIGN MIL FIN WAIVED	FOREIGN MIL FIN DIRECT	FOREIGN MIL FIN GUARANTY	COMMERCIAL EXPORTS DELIVERIES
50	50,797	2,000	50,797	2,000	-	-	-	-	-	-
51	78,598	19,026	78,598	19,026	-	-	-	-	-	-
52	98,992	69,238	98,992	69,238	-	-	-	-	-	-
53	77,816	60,394	77,816	60,394	-	-	-	-	-	-
54	91,578	120,651	91,578	120,451	-	-	-	-	-	-
55	84,194	118,015	84,194	118,015	-	-	-	-	-	-
56	133,104	117,675	133,104	117,675	-	-	-	-	-	-
57	347,323	106,667	347,323	106,467	-	-	-	-	-	-
58	313,522	328,557	313,522	328,557	-	-	-	-	-	-
59	347,792	201,527	347,792	201,527	-	-	-	-	-	-
60	241,851	323,149	241,851	323,149	-	-	-	-	-	-
61	421,985	290,498	421,985	290,498	-	-	-	-	-	-
62	645,761	333,152	645,761	333,152	-	-	-	-	-	-
63	805,664	781,852	804,891	781,852	773	-	-	-	-	-
64	1,411,023	481,522	1,411,023	481,522	-	-	-	-	-	-
65	1,415,093	703,384	1,230,494	703,384	184,599	-	-	-	-	-
66	1,379,076	746,556	1,379,076	736,556	-	-	-	-	-	-
67	1,070,022	797,473	1,054,523	777,473	15,499	10,000	-	-	-	-
68	1,171,197	986,705	1,170,061	966,705	1,136	20,000	-	-	-	-
69	1,154,617	1,277,211	1,154,617	1,255,867	-	21,344	-	-	-	-
70	1,066,527	1,340,699	1,018,749	1,320,699	-	20,000	-	-	-	-
71	1,395,633	1,410,215	1,395,633	1,371,106	47,778	39,000	-	-	-	-
72	2,833,929	1,465,207	2,830,429	1,342,375	-	122,832	-	-	-	-
73	5,788,271	1,519,664	4,658,975	1,366,085	3,500	153,580	-	-	-	-
74	8,958,497	3,189,037	8,530,495	3,068,754	1,129,296	120,283	-	-	-	-
75	13,731,095	5,513,613	10,897,772	5,284,244	428,003	139,838	-	-	-	-
76	13,601,276	5,755,879	8,198,485	5,284,244	5,402,791	471,635	-	-	-	-
77	6,083,174	6,987,792	5,502,530	6,503,873	580,664	83,919	-	-	-	-
78	7,171,542	7,501,696	6,524,661	6,307,975	616,881	1,193,721	-	-	-	-
79	11,991,733	7,991,948	11,177,484	6,488,784	814,249	1,503,163	-	-	-	-
80	13,944,871	7,225,282	12,285,780	7,766,886	1,659,091	1,458,396	-	-	-	-
81	7,128,073	8,973,486	6,246,006	7,481,751	882,067	1,491,735	-	-	-	-
82	16,284,939	10,445,336	16,186,959	8,668,675	97,979	1,776,662	-	-	-	-
83	14,318,636	12,767,223	14,296,786	10,606,795	21,850	2,160,428	-	-	-	-
84	12,822,454	8,431,137	10,403,224	7,508,743	404,479	922,394	-	-	-	-
85	11,360,880	7,809,855	6,301,880	7,236,031	697,656	573,824	-	-	-	-
86	6,371,116	11,161,707	6,253,629	10,876,542	129,826	265,165	-	-	-	-
87	6,383,521	9,201,677	11,394,921	8,790,663	209,518	411,013	-	-	-	-
88	11,604,438	7,333,075	10,485,798	6,942,576	79,373	390,499	-	-	-	-
89	10,565,171	7,786,616	13,735,480	7,438,878	551,272	347,738	-	-	-	-
90	14,286,057	9,175,905	22,725,578	8,761,831	743,479	414,074	-	-	-	-
91	23,469,052	10,016,662	14,983,717	9,675,035	188,031	341,627	-	-	-	-
92	15,171,747						-	-	-	-

TOTAL 247,673,337 168,488,775 229,590,942 152,140,506 18,082,395 16,348,269 36,595,425 11,137,301 27,826,621 60,322,794

FY 76 INCLUDES TRANSITIONAL QTR (FY 7T) TOTALS MAY NOT ADD DUE TO ROUNDING * LESS THAN \$500

U S A F I S C A L Y E A R S E R I E S
(DOLLARS IN THOUSANDS)

YEAR	MAP MERGER FUNDS	MAP PROGRAM (+ SEC 506)	MAP DELIVERIES (+ SEC 506)	MASF (INCL INQ) PROGRAM	MASF (INCL INQ) DELIVERIES	EXCESS MAP/MASF PROGRAM	EXCESS MAP/MASF DELIVERIES	INET PROGRAM (+ SEC 506)	STUDENTS TRAINED (INET, MASF, 506)
50	-	1,117,023	49,360	-	-	232,978	28,071	5,595	327
51	-	3,076,786	888,275	-	-	166,196	279,065	31,961	3,739
52	-	4,157,367	1,352,601	-	-	186,333	177,181	69,453	12,009
53	-	2,384,083	3,611,734	-	-	78,200	133,905	94,126	15,263
54	-	2,133,639	3,011,590	-	-	93,257	87,880	55,785	10,665
55	-	1,472,816	2,235,060	-	-	87,670	88,215	63,664	11,266
56	-	2,173,631	2,896,474	-	-	97,607	93,077	71,581	9,532
57	-	1,785,538	2,591,162	-	-	94,820	71,949	69,388	11,369
58	-	1,208,424	2,261,291	-	-	235,409	207,178	77,861	10,845
59	-	1,829,495	2,059,159	-	-	303,399	176,158	91,262	9,275
60	-	1,862,942	1,702,832	-	-	141,256	215,645	89,167	16,556
61	-	1,697,015	1,250,297	-	-	191,795	228,434	91,167	28,384
62	-	1,320,729	1,527,656	-	-	373,796	240,136	103,371	26,382
63	-	1,433,207	1,527,656	-	-	127,126	210,118	144,764	50,177
64	-	913,441	1,179,547	-	-	106,982	141,010	97,599	18,322
65	-	880,558	1,361,481	-	-	221,642	175,108	91,470	16,297
66	-	901,691	1,016,511	-	-	200,380	190,215	68,917	17,088
67	-	824,885	931,006	-	-	344,966	379,994	50,564	17,318
68	-	556,571	720,950	-	-	442,309	442,309	39,558	15,496
69	-	417,052	604,949	-	-	644,347	530,167	35,448	18,303
70	-	347,743	499,769	-	-	543,026	510,982	32,529	21,855
71	-	718,820	523,518	-	-	393,386	370,027	30,766	25,266
72	-	512,028	557,973	-	-	414,265	376,974	27,371	12,510
73	-	704,522	505,160	-	-	103,688	98,792	24,866	7,010
74	-	505,160	690,612	-	-	29,703	44,724	23,779	4,858
75	-	254,715	363,962	-	-	1,376	62,998	27,935	4,429
76	-	225,617	108,244	-	-	406	5,452	26,623	3,772
77	-	209,911	213,297	-	-	46	2,762	24,695	3,545
78	-	217,405	157,834	-	-	48,615	17,087	27,675	4,836
79	-	134,728	302,032	-	-	110,268	5,698	43,873	6,161
80	-	150,733	208,665	-	-	170	-	47,044	7,442
81	-	130,827	160,691	-	-	-	-	52,225	5,794
82	-	88,727	126,044	-	-	-	-	54,377	6,697
83	-	57,705	76,117	-	-	-	-	50,513	6,134
84	-	54,000	74,799	-	-	-	-	45,072	6,198
85	-	66,111	54,714	-	-	-	-	45,422	5,773
86	-	37,618	51,287	-	-	-	-	45,541	5,205
87	-	114,970	141,521	-	-	-	-	46,432	4,895
88	-	137,300	130,044	-	-	-	-	44,585	4,446
89	-	177,245	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
90	-	116,269	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
91	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
92	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-

TOTAL 4,572,451 38,556,274 38,309,391 17,067,624 17,067,624 6,534,403 6,388,127 2,280,313 569,256

FY 76 INCLUDES TRANSITIONAL QTR (FY 71) TOTALS MAY NOT ADD DUE TO ROUNDING X LESS THAN \$500

EUROPE AND CANADA

D S A A F I S C A L Y E A R S E R I E S
(DOLLARS IN THOUSANDS)

YEAR	TOTAL SALES AGREEMENTS	TOTAL SALES DELIVERIES	FMS AGREEMENTS	FMS DELIVERIES	FMCS AGREEMENTS	FMCS DELIVERIES	FOREIGN MIL FIN WAIVED	FOREIGN MIL FIN DIRECT	FOREIGN MIL FIN GUARANTY	COMMERCIAL EXPORTS DELIVERIES
50	49,223	1,807	49,223	1,807	-	-	-	-	-	-
51	55,444	17,580	55,444	17,580	-	-	-	-	-	-
52	79,034	51,117	79,034	51,117	-	-	-	-	-	-
53	26,167	25,609	26,167	25,609	-	-	-	-	-	-
54	72,573	93,341	72,573	93,341	-	-	-	-	-	-
55	51,159	92,301	51,159	92,301	-	-	-	-	-	-
56	94,644	76,364	94,644	76,364	-	-	-	-	-	-
57	285,541	84,205	285,541	84,205	-	-	-	-	-	-
58	216,894	254,658	216,894	254,658	-	-	-	-	-	-
59	313,414	151,455	313,414	151,455	-	-	-	36,518	-	-
60	159,521	246,790	159,521	246,790	-	-	-	-	-	-
61	353,562	236,204	353,562	236,204	-	-	-	-	-	-
62	545,662	262,175	545,662	262,175	-	-	-	-	-	-
63	687,913	677,094	687,140	677,094	-	-	-	51,649	-	-
64	1,183,005	397,522	1,183,005	397,522	773	-	-	17,048	-	-
65	632,184	572,313	632,184	572,313	-	-	-	3,475	-	-
66	1,094,630	522,216	1,094,630	522,216	-	-	-	-	-	-
67	513,773	544,182	513,773	544,182	-	-	-	-	-	-
68	544,432	592,115	544,370	592,115	-	-	-	-	-	-
69	628,169	789,502	628,169	789,502	62	-	-	-	-	-
70	474,414	677,580	474,414	677,580	-	-	-	20,000	-	-
71	465,112	656,824	465,112	656,824	-	-	-	-	-	-
72	1,271,414	676,869	1,271,414	676,857	-	-	-	18,000	-	-
73	853,336	552,434	846,450	552,434	-	-	-	49,971	-	-
74	1,220,919	745,424	1,220,919	745,424	6,885	-	-	55,000	25,000	226,247
75	6,456,685	961,085	6,456,685	960,415	-	-	-	72,500	23,000	172,289
76	1,252,916	1,395,888	1,252,916	1,389,980	-	-	-	63,000	98,000	221,151
77	1,143,018	1,063,062	1,142,767	1,063,062	-	-	-	-	281,000	276,641
78	1,559,011	916,955	1,559,011	916,546	250	-	-	-	367,000	295,446
79	1,837,981	1,437,630	1,837,355	1,437,576	-	-	-	-	435,000	663,283
80	4,417,764	2,389,421	4,417,764	2,389,284	627	-	-	-	435,000	597,957
81	2,133,151	2,588,155	2,133,151	2,588,059	-	-	-	-	435,000	698,536
82	2,049,216	2,782,703	2,049,173	2,782,644	-	-	-	-	546,500	935,489
83	6,524,454	2,548,890	6,524,454	2,548,878	43	-	-	-	793,000	1,147,263
84	3,855,589	2,072,890	3,855,587	2,072,880	-	-	-	-	1,022,500	898,303
85	2,118,589	1,933,944	2,118,589	1,933,944	-	-	-	-	1,530,000	286,088
86	2,057,549	2,643,039	2,057,549	2,643,039	-	-	-	-	-	1,058,895
87	1,597,087	3,259,923	1,597,087	3,259,923	2	-	-	1,440,000	-	1,791,915
88	1,774,771	3,244,455	1,773,616	3,244,426	-	-	-	625,941	-	1,314,668
89	2,651,824	2,928,493	2,639,817	2,928,493	60,943	-	-	493,500	-	2,382,225
90	2,609,909	2,688,201	2,609,909	2,688,194	1,155	-	-	410,000	-	1,832,335
91	6,403,501	2,476,603	6,403,451	2,476,603	12,007	-	-	404,254	-	3,932,311
92	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	420,000	-	2,292,393
TOTAL	69,438,270	48,501,106	69,355,472	48,491,488	82,798	9,617	2,358,476	5,791,824	6,079,000	23,316,536

FY 76 INCLUDES TRANSITIONAL QTR (FY 71)

TOTALS MAY NOT ADD DUE TO ROUNDING

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* LESS THAN \$500

AS OF 30 SEP 92

YEAR	MAP MERGER FUNDS	MAP PROGRAM (+ SEC 506)	MAP DELIVERIES (+ SEC 506)	MAF (INCL TNG) PROGRAM	MAF (INCL TNG) DELIVERIES	EXCESS MAP/MAF PROGRAM	EXCESS MAP/MAF DELIVERIES	IMET PROGRAM (+ SEC 506)	STUDENTS TRAINED (IMET, MASF, 506)
50	-	1,040,309	46,652	-	-	223,871	24,631	4,891	18
51	-	3,543,268	707,985	-	-	152,982	268,016	31,210	3,518
52	-	3,562,461	1,088,760	-	-	111,746	167,370	64,899	10,883
53	-	1,668,435	2,845,480	-	-	34,265	33,722	77,359	12,642
54	-	1,445,976	2,358,764	-	-	24,611	29,640	42,783	7,182
55	-	676,242	1,620,031	-	-	20,848	24,909	33,163	4,495
56	-	801,279	1,907,785	-	-	34,433	39,076	27,232	2,811
57	-	438,800	1,432,067	-	-	26,419	18,662	24,002	3,407
58	-	592,093	1,139,235	-	-	37,221	36,854	25,105	2,503
59	-	756,785	830,931	-	-	42,526	47,710	32,800	2,569
60	-	738,119	771,787	-	-	51,123	47,790	23,084	3,192
61	-	672,420	419,267	-	-	39,432	38,943	18,087	6,729
62	-	351,848	350,096	-	-	179,298	61,429	37,936	17,278
63	-	444,288	410,309	-	-	35,095	115,976	13,514	4,980
64	-	250,669	348,683	-	-	15,285	68,888	8,567	2,437
65	-	190,660	478,169	-	-	70,173	30,687	9,815	1,805
66	-	238,406	273,730	-	-	70,279	89,763	6,552	1,941
67	-	231,024	214,624	-	-	66,139	47,591	6,747	1,472
68	-	127,254	199,028	-	-	110,993	60,719	5,124	1,369
69	-	136,127	188,500	-	-	149,801	114,208	4,947	1,319
70	-	125,437	151,811	-	-	156,637	157,213	5,061	923
71	-	136,183	171,364	-	-	157,518	197,287	3,685	857
72	-	77,967	135,863	-	-	157,515	126,605	3,126	495
73	-	76,588	91,914	-	-	136,676	137,829	1,913	582
74	-	80,329	82,122	-	-	38,325	27,554	2,266	507
75	-	14,430	65,217	-	-	4,520	18	4,078	569
76	-	33,030	2,662	-	-	30	16	6,359	309
77	-	65,600	23,843	-	-	8	552	4,443	540
78	-	68,529	38,647	-	-	1	11,328	7,111	704
79	-	108,465	95,171	-	-	48,613	16,737	8,848	673
80	-	37,916	58,348	-	-	110,268	5,209	8,401	669
81	-	55,889	121,361	-	-	-	-	10,514	694
82	-	122,500	70,096	-	-	-	-	9,016	747
83	-	180,000	47,805	-	-	-	-	10,194	620
84	-	285,300	7,872	-	-	-	-	9,815	598
85	-	272,745	11,838	-	-	-	-	8,812	647
86	-	392,059	3,685	-	-	-	-	8,370	622
87	-	266,000	8,375	-	-	-	-	7,427	558
88	-	99,250	447	-	-	-	-	9,884	516
89	-	-	2,017	-	-	-	-	-	-
90	-	-	1,420	-	-	-	-	-	-
91	-	-	39,843	-	-	-	-	-	-
92	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
TOTAL	1,688,354	18,942,911	18,867,616	-	-	2,316,656	2,172,753	664,271	109,711

FY 76 INCLUDES TRANSITIONAL QIR (FY 71)

TOTALS MAY NOT ADD DUE TO ROUNDING

* LESS THAN \$500

TURKEY

D S A N F I S C A L Y E A R S E R I E S
(DOLLARS IN THOUSANDS)

YEAR	TOTAL SALES AGREEMENTS	TOTAL SALES DELIVERIES	FMS AGREEMENTS	FMS DELIVERIES	FMS AGREEMENTS	FMS DELIVERIES	FOREIGN MIL FIN WAIVED	FOREIGN MIL FIN DIRECT	FOREIGN MIL FIN GUARANTY	COMMERCIAL EXPORTS DELIVERIES
50	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
51	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
52	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
53	10	10	10	10	-	-	-	-	-	-
54	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
55	4	4	4	4	-	-	-	-	-	-
56	14	-	14	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
57	12	-	12	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
58	13	30	13	30	-	-	-	-	-	-
59	3	3	3	3	-	-	-	-	-	-
60	47	51	47	51	-	-	-	-	-	-
61	97	6	97	6	-	-	-	-	-	-
62	12	75	12	75	-	-	-	-	-	-
63	28	49	28	49	-	-	-	-	-	-
64	182	32	182	32	-	-	-	-	-	-
65	129	1	129	1	-	-	-	-	-	-
66	804	460	804	460	-	-	-	-	-	-
67	946	249	946	249	-	-	-	-	-	-
68	139	228	139	228	-	-	-	-	-	-
69	2,096	390	2,096	390	-	-	-	-	-	-
70	2,578	3,287	2,578	3,287	-	-	-	-	-	-
71	1,140	1,30	1,140	1,30	-	-	-	-	-	-
72	5,012	1,052	5,012	1,052	-	-	-	-	-	-
73	206,811	7,621	206,811	7,621	-	-	-	14,971	-	3,077
74	106,156	16,985	106,156	16,985	-	-	-	20,000	-	1,925
75	72,583	89,818	72,583	89,818	-	-	-	45,000	-	1,063
76	116,907	106,224	116,907	106,224	-	-	-	40,000	-	3,302
77	118,328	35,011	118,328	35,011	-	-	-	-	30,000	1,569
78	157,538	158,734	157,538	158,734	-	-	-	-	125,000	10,081
79	132,450	129,983	132,450	129,983	-	-	-	-	175,000	9,077
80	62,633	135,284	62,633	135,284	-	-	-	-	202,900	1,127
81	280,265	108,903	280,265	108,903	-	-	-	-	250,000	2,707
82	446,242	187,565	446,242	187,565	-	-	-	-	343,000	10,000
83	446,443	304,907	446,443	304,907	-	-	-	-	290,000	4,942
84	3,784,419	3,784,419	3,784,419	3,784,419	-	-	-	-	585,000	26,751
85	364,961	389,756	364,961	389,756	-	-	-	-	-	27,848
86	411,450	282,300	411,450	282,300	-	-	-	485,000	-	23,813
87	215,053	278,967	215,053	278,967	-	-	-	409,453	-	67,947
88	117,797	701,698	117,797	701,698	-	-	-	177,941	-	342,653
89	332,941	618,859	332,941	618,859	-	-	-	90,000	-	220,302
90	477,234	720,138	477,234	720,138	-	-	-	85,630	-	67,013
91	216,933	706,852	216,933	706,852	-	-	-	100,000	-	34,948
92	1,852,231	770,666	1,852,231	770,666	-	-	-	25,000	-	-
TOTAL	9,930,942	5,906,514	9,930,942	5,906,514	-	-	1,883,970	1,670,995	2,335,900	922,572

FY 76 INCLUDES TRANSITIONAL QTR (FY 7T)

TOTALS MAY NOT ADD DUE TO ROUNDING

* LESS THAN \$500

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AS OF 30 SEP 92

YEAR	MAP MERGER FUNDS	MAP PROGRAM (+ SEC 506)	MAP DELIVERIES (+ SEC 506)	MASF (INCL TNG) PROGRAM	MASF (INCL TNG) DELIVERIES	EXCESS MAP/MASF PROGRAM	EXCESS MAP/MASF DELIVERIES	IMET PROGRAM (+ SEC 506)	STUDENTS TRAINED (IMET, MASF, 506)
50	-	103,311	1,020	-	-	13,302	-	689	-
51	-	169,642	43,060	-	-	6,427	19,729	758	-
52	-	186,536	99,068	-	-	1,632	1,632	1,564	-
53	-	154,590	147,322	-	-	9,415	7,066	5,010	561
54	-	333,250	232,963	-	-	3,140	2,573	5,350	849
55	-	13,899	155,265	-	-	1,310	2,384	6,201	985
56	-	183,682	188,745	-	-	3,320	1,826	4,218	1,185
57	-	83,571	150,333	-	-	2,221	4,949	6,081	480
58	-	144,763	245,717	-	-	5,556	1,528	5,268	383
59	-	184,110	193,129	-	-	16,008	4,949	7,536	694
60	-	107,926	88,926	-	-	10,345	14,810	5,268	605
61	-	134,003	78,840	-	-	14,257	13,200	7,893	697
62	-	169,104	137,903	-	-	6,905	10,038	7,886	1,332
63	-	107,755	161,912	-	-	5,807	4,949	7,457	3,481
64	-	91,455	97,373	-	-	7,967	7,877	6,114	1,951
65	-	107,569	113,134	-	-	51,100	6,090	5,556	1,064
66	-	127,195	94,559	-	-	36,168	12,644	4,287	605
67	-	88,793	116,577	-	-	40,440	38,798	5,546	663
68	-	95,635	105,742	-	-	79,183	40,175	4,154	993
69	-	85,374	111,223	-	-	80,225	77,181	4,283	653
70	-	95,859	88,142	-	-	105,538	100,942	3,009	404
71	-	58,013	69,643	-	-	104,479	76,475	2,694	596
72	-	64,063	65,512	-	-	119,299	67,386	2,052	667
73	-	77,060	65,816	-	-	38,298	103,588	1,687	208
74	-	13,003	52,889	-	-	4,520	110,905	2,478	253
75	-	-	-	-	-	-	27,156	378	268
76	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	102
77	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
78	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
79	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
80	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
81	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
82	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
83	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
84	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
85	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
86	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
87	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
88	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
89	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
90	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
91	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
92	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
TOTAL	1,255,064	3,245,340	3,170,169	-	-	855,307	854,416	150,177	22,329

FY 76 INCLUDES TRANSITIONAL QTR (FY 7T)

TOTALS MAY NOT ADD DUE TO ROUNDING

* LESS THAN \$500

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
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